Overview

EccoWare represented a pivotal moment in electronic trading evolution - the transition from manual floor trading to fully automated algorithmic execution. As a founding team member, I helped architect and build what became the first commercial algorithmic HFT platform, fundamentally changing how derivatives were traded.

The company was acquired by eSpeed (BGC Partners/Cantor Fitzgerald) for £12M, with the technology forming the foundation for institutional algorithmic trading infrastructure that followed.

This early-career experience established deep technical expertise in trading system architecture, high-performance computing, and financial market microstructure - capabilities that underpin all subsequent work including current blockchain protocol development.

Genesis: From LIFFE Floor to Algorithmic Trading

Westminster Trading / REFCO (1998)

The journey began as a "yellow jacket" on the LIFFE trading floor during the final days of open outcry. Officially hired as a floor trader for Westminster Trading (the locals clearing operation for REFCO), the role quickly evolved:

• Systems integration: Reconciling REFCO clearing system with ORC trading platforms

• Screen scraping technology: Built automated scraping of VT220 terminals to enable algorithmic trading onto DTB (Deutsche Terminbörse) terminals

• Early automation: Creating the technical infrastructure to bridge manual trading and electronic execution

The inflection point: REFCO shut down the Westminster Trading business, but the management team recognized the opportunity in electronic trading automation.

EccoWare Formation (1998-1999)

The Westminster Trading management team pivoted to form EccoWare, focused entirely on building algorithmic trading infrastructure for the emerging electronic derivatives markets.

Mission: Create commercial-grade algorithmic trading platform enabling sophisticated execution strategies across multiple exchanges and asset classes.

Market timing: Perfect convergence of:

• European derivatives exchanges transitioning to electronic trading

• Increased computational power making complex algorithms viable

• Growing demand from proprietary trading firms and investment banks

• Regulatory changes enabling greater automation

Technical Innovation & Architecture

First Commercial Algorithmic HFT Platform (1999)

Core achievement: Co-architected the first commercial platform enabling algorithmic high-frequency trading across multiple derivatives exchanges.

Technical characteristics:

• C++ infrastructure for microsecond-level latency requirements

• Multi-exchange connectivity - unified interface across DTB, LIFFE, EUREX, and other venues

• Algorithmic execution strategies - not just order routing, but intelligent execution logic

• Risk management integration - real-time position monitoring and exposure limits

• Market data processing - high-speed tick processing and order book reconstruction

Innovation areas:

1. Low-latency architecture:

   • Custom C++ frameworks optimized for speed

   • Direct exchange connectivity protocols

   • Memory-efficient data structures for market data processing

   • Minimize network hops and processing overhead

2. Algorithmic strategy framework:

   • VWAP and TWAP execution algorithms

   • Iceberg order management

   • Smart order routing across venues

   • Spread trading and arbitrage strategies

3. Risk management systems:

   • Real-time position monitoring

   • Pre-trade risk checks

   • Exposure limit enforcement

   • Multi-asset portfolio risk calculation

4. Market microstructure optimization:

   • Order book dynamics modeling

   • Optimal execution timing

   • Liquidity detection and assessment

   • Transaction cost analysis

Patent Development

The technical innovation at EccoWare resulted in multiple patent applications that became foundational IP in electronic trading:

Systems and Patents Filed During EccoWare Period:

Trading System (Yield Spreader)

• Patent: US 20090012893 (filed during EccoWare/eSpeed period)

• Innovation: Automated trading for yield-based derivatives

• Technical contribution: Enabled collaborative processing computing yields of non-fixed-income instruments, automated trading based on yield comparisons

System and Method for Determining Availability of a Tradable Instrument

• Patent: US 20070016506 (filed 2007 but based on EccoWare-era innovation)

• Innovation: Methodology for calculating instrument availability

• Technical contribution: Determines available vs. unavailable offered quantities, enables accurate tracking across related instruments

Systems and Methods for Providing Dynamic Price Axes

• Patent: US 20090043664 (filed 2006 but rooted in EccoWare UI innovation)

• Innovation: Dynamic display of bid/ask prices where prices change locations as inside market moves

• Technical contribution: Created intuitive visual representation of market movement for traders

These patents represented real innovation solving actual trading problems, not speculative IP. Each addressed specific challenges we encountered building commercial trading systems for demanding institutional clients.

Market Impact

Transforming Derivatives Trading

EccoWare's platform fundamentally changed how derivatives were traded:

Before: Manual floor trading, voice broking, limited automation
After: Algorithmic execution, multi-venue strategies, microsecond decision-making

Client adoption:

• Proprietary trading firms using algorithms for market-making

• Investment banks deploying automated execution strategies

• Hedge funds leveraging HFT for arbitrage opportunities

• Futures Commission Merchants offering algo execution to clients

Technology Diffusion

The architectural patterns and techniques developed at EccoWare became industry standards:

• C++ as the language of choice for low-latency trading

• Direct exchange connectivity over FIX protocol

• Algorithmic execution frameworks

• Real-time risk management integration

Acquisition by eSpeed (BGC/Cantor)

Exit: Acquired for £12M by eSpeed (part of BGC Partners/Cantor Fitzgerald)

Strategic rationale:

• eSpeed wanted to expand beyond US Treasuries into European derivatives

• EccoWare provided proven technology and team with deep market expertise

• Platform could be integrated with eSpeed's existing infrastructure

• Access to European client base and exchange relationships

Personal outcome: Continued with acquiring company in senior technical and product management roles, eventually becoming VP Global Head of Futures Product Management.

The acquisition validated both the technical innovation and commercial viability of the platform we'd built.

Skills & Expertise Developed

Technical Capabilities

Low-latency systems engineering:

• C++ optimization techniques for microsecond-level performance

• Network programming and exchange connectivity

• Memory management for high-throughput systems

• Multi-threading and concurrency patterns

Financial system architecture:

• Trading system design patterns

• Market data processing architectures

• Order management systems

• Risk management frameworks

• Exchange integration methodologies

Algorithmic trading:

• Execution algorithm design

• Market microstructure analysis

• Order book dynamics

• Transaction cost modeling

• Strategy backtesting frameworks

Business & Product Skills

Product development:

• Translating trader requirements into technical specifications

• Balancing performance, functionality, and reliability

• Iterative development with demanding users

• Feature prioritization under resource constraints

Market understanding:

• Deep knowledge of derivatives markets

• Exchange operations and rulebooks

• Clearing and settlement mechanics

• Regulatory requirements across jurisdictions

Startup operations:

• Building products with limited resources

• Rapid iteration based on market feedback

• Client relationship management in early-stage company

• Contributing to strategic direction

Foundational Lessons

This early experience established principles that guide all subsequent work:

1. Technical Excellence Matters

In trading systems, performance isn't a nice-to-have - it's existential. Microseconds determine profitability. This discipline carries through to current blockchain work where gas optimization and throughput are critical.

2. Innovation Must Solve Real Problems

The patents we filed weren't speculative - they solved actual pain points we encountered building for demanding clients. Same approach now: Pascal Protocol addresses real clearing challenges, not theoretical problems.

3. Architecture Determines Scale

Early architectural decisions constrained or enabled future growth. Getting core patterns right from the start mattered more than quick features. This thinking influences current protocol design.

4. Market Structure Drives Technology

You can't build trading technology without deep understanding of market microstructure, clearing mechanics, and regulatory constraints. Technical solutions must align with market reality.

5. Teams Matter More Than Individuals

Building complex systems requires collaboration. The EccoWare founding team's combined expertise exceeded what any individual could accomplish. Same principle applies to current ventures.

Legacy & Ongoing Relevance

Direct Technical Lineage

The technical foundations from EccoWare directly inform current work:

Then (1999): Building C++ HFT platform for derivatives
Now (2024): Building on-chain clearing infrastructure for derivatives

Common threads:

• Obsession with performance and efficiency

• Deep understanding of derivatives risk management

• Focus on portfolio-level rather than individual instrument thinking

• Rigorous testing and quality standards

• Institutional-grade reliability requirements

Patent Foundation

The patents filed during and shortly after EccoWare created IP portfolio demonstrating consistent innovation capability over 25+ years:

• 1999-2007: Trading system patents (EccoWare era)

• 2012: Bin-based risk management patent

• 2013: Perpetual futures patent

• 2022-present: Pascal Protocol development

This track record matters for HMRC purposes - it's not recent invention, it's decades of continuous IP creation.

Market Understanding

The market structure expertise developed trading derivatives in the 1990s/2000s remains highly relevant:

• Clearing mechanics haven't fundamentally changed

• Portfolio margining principles are identical

• Risk management approaches translate directly

• Market microstructure understanding applies to DEXs

EccoWare provided the foundation for understanding how derivatives markets actually work - knowledge that proves invaluable when building blockchain-based clearing infrastructure.

Connection to Handleport Services

This experience enables Handleport to:

1. Technical Credibility: Not theoretical knowledge - hands-on experience building production trading systems at scale

2. IP Development: Proven track record creating valuable, commercially relevant patents

3. System Architecture: Deep expertise in high-performance, mission-critical systems design

4. Trading Expertise: Real understanding of derivatives, execution, and market microstructure

5. Startup Experience: Been through early-stage company building and successful exit

6. Innovation Capability: Demonstrated ability to identify problems and architect novel solutions

The Trading Technologies Ladder Patent Litigation

Background: The Price Ladder Innovation

During the EccoWare period, we developed what became known as the "price ladder" - a vertical graphical display showing bid and ask prices with quantities, enabling single-click trading. This UI innovation fundamentally changed how traders interacted with electronic markets.

The innovation:

• Vertical price axis with best bid/ask prominently displayed

• Visual representation of order book depth

• Single-click order entry at specific price levels

• Dynamic updating as market moved

• Intuitive interface requiring minimal training

Critical point: We invented the term "ladder" to describe this interface. It wasn't borrowed from elsewhere - we needed a name for what we'd built, and "ladder" captured the vertical price structure.

This was parallel development solving an obvious problem: how to display an electronic order book intuitively for traders accustomed to seeing prices called out on trading floors. Multiple firms were working on similar solutions simultaneously because the problem was universal.

The Patent Wars Era

Industry context (late 1990s - early 2000s):

The electronic trading industry was in a destructive patent war period. Trading Technologies (TT) had filed patents on the price ladder and related trading interface elements, then began aggressive litigation against competing platforms.

The fundamental problem: First-to-file patent system was stifling innovation

In practice, this meant:

• Whoever filed first could claim ownership of obvious solutions to common problems

• Parallel development was ignored - if someone filed first, everyone else infringed

• Innovation was being locked up by patent thickets rather than enabling progress

• Small improvements or obvious solutions were being patented aggressively

• Litigation became a competitive weapon rather than IP protection

The irony: TT's developers had been observed at Transmarket copying our spreader technology. Yet they were suing us for patent infringement on the ladder interface.

This created an absurd situation: we'd independently developed the ladder interface, even coined the term, but because TT filed patents first, we were allegedly infringing. I believe that eSpeed settled around the time I left that business, but am not aware of the final statements.

EccoWare/eSpeed Independent Development

Our development timeline:

The price ladder emerged organically from trader requirements:

1. Floor trading background: Many of us had floor experience and understood how traders processed price information visually

2. Electronic order books: Markets were transitioning to electronic, but interfaces were primitive

3. Trader feedback: Direct interaction with users telling us what they needed

4. Iterative development: Building, testing, refining based on actual trading use

Critical evidence of independent development:

• Our developers had NOT seen Trading Technologies' implementation before building the ladder

• We invented the terminology - "ladder" was our term for the interface we'd created

• Different implementation details - while the concept was similar, the actual code and design choices differed

• Solving an obvious problem - anyone building an electronic trading platform would arrive at similar solutions

The development environment: We were in London building for European markets while TT was in Chicago focused on US exchanges. Geographic and market separation meant limited interaction or knowledge sharing between firms.

30(b)(6) Witness Role

Legal designation: Corporate representative witness for eSpeed in the Trading Technologies litigation

30(b)(6) explanation: Under US federal rules, a 30(b)(6) designation means the witness represents the company's knowledge on specified topics. It's not just personal testimony - you're speaking for the entire organization.

Testimony scope:

• Independent development of the price ladder interface

• Timeline of UI innovation at EccoWare/eSpeed

• Technical implementation details

• Development process and design decisions

• Knowledge (or lack thereof) of TT's patents and implementations

• Industry practices around electronic trading interface design

Key testimony points:

1. Parallel development was common: Multiple firms solving identical problems with similar solutions because the problems were obvious

2. No knowledge of TT implementation: Our developers built the ladder based on trader requirements and floor trading intuition, not by copying TT

3. Independent invention of terminology: "Ladder" was our term for our interface, not borrowed language

4. Geographic and market separation: Limited interaction between European and US electronic trading development communities

5. Industry norms: Sharing ideas and concepts was common (as evidenced by TT developers being at Transmarket), but everyone implemented independently

The Transmarket Irony

A particularly galling aspect of the litigation:

We were aware that TT developers had been at Transmarket (a client) observing and copying our spreader technology.

The spreader innovation: Complex derivatives trading tool allowing traders to simultaneously quote multiple related contracts (calendar spreads, butterfly spreads, etc.) with automatic leg calculation and risk management.

The situation:

• TT developers observed our spreader implementation at Transmarket

• They incorporated similar concepts into their own platform

• Yet TT was suing us for allegedly copying their ladder patent

• The first-to-file system meant observation of our technology was irrelevant - their earlier patent filing gave them legal standing

This highlighted the fundamental problem with the patent system during this era: actual innovation and development timelines mattered less than who filed paperwork first.

Stifling Innovation: The First-to-File Problem

The industry impact:

The patent wars were actively harmful to innovation in electronic trading:

1. Defensive patent portfolios: Firms filed patents not to protect genuine innovation but to create bargaining chips for cross-licensing negotiations

2. Patent thickets: Every minor UI improvement or obvious solution got patented, creating minefields for new entrants

3. Litigation as competitive weapon: Patents used to slow competitors rather than protect genuine IP

4. Reduced collaboration: Fear of patent infringement reduced information sharing that previously helped the industry advance

5. Innovation tax: Development costs increased as firms had to navigate patent landscapes and pay licensing fees

6. Startup deterrent: New entrants faced immediate patent litigation regardless of independent development

The parallel development problem:

When a problem has an obvious solution, multiple smart people will arrive at similar answers independently. The first-to-file system punished this natural process, granting monopolies on obvious solutions simply because one firm filed paperwork first.

Examples from electronic trading:

• Price ladder displays (obvious: show prices vertically with best bid/ask prominent)

• One-click trading (obvious: click price to submit order at that level)

• Spread trading tools (obvious: calculate leg quantities automatically for common spreads)

• Market data visualization (obvious: use color coding for price movements)

None of these were revolutionary breakthroughs - they were natural solutions to common problems. Further a lot of these terms (one click, static) didn’t have clear legal definitions. Yet all became subjects of patent litigation.

Litigation Outcome & Industry Impact

The broader resolution:

The TT ladder patent litigation eventually resulted in settlements and cross-licensing agreements across the industry. No clear "winner" emerged - instead, the industry reached an uneasy détente where major platforms had mutual non-aggression agreements while extracting licensing fees from smaller entrants.

Personal lessons learned:

1. Patent strategy matters: Independent development isn't a defense under first-to-file systems

2. Documentation is critical: Detailed records of development timelines and design decisions become crucial in litigation

3. Industry collaboration vs. IP protection: Tension between sharing knowledge to advance the field and protecting competitive advantages

4. Expert testimony requirements: Ability to explain complex technical concepts clearly to non-technical judges and juries

5. Patent quality varies: Many patents granted shouldn't have been - they covered obvious solutions or overly broad claims

Impact on subsequent IP strategy:

This experience shaped approach to IP creation going forward:

• File patents on genuine innovations: Don't just patent obvious solutions, focus on novel approaches to hard problems

• Document independent development: Maintain clear records of design decisions and development timelines

• Consider prior art carefully: Understand what others have done before filing

• Balance IP protection with innovation: Patents should enable innovation, not stifle it

Relevance to Current Work

The lessons from the ladder patent wars apply directly to blockchain/crypto IP:

1. DeFi innovation environment: Currently similar to late-1990s electronic trading - rapid innovation with unclear IP boundaries

2. Obvious solutions risk: Many "innovations" in DeFi are obvious solutions to common problems (like the ladder was)

3. Parallel development common: Multiple projects solving identical problems (e.g., automated market makers, lending protocols)

4. Patent strategy considerations: Whether and when to patent blockchain innovations remains contentious

Current IP approach:

Learning from the ladder patent experience:

• Focus on genuinely novel solutions to hard problems (portfolio margining on-chain)

• Ensure implementation details differ from obvious approaches

• Document development process showing independent innovation

• Consider open-source vs. patent protection trade-offs

• Avoid patenting obvious solutions just to create defensive portfolios

The perpetual futures patent (2013): Filed years before crypto perpetuals became standard, representing genuine foresight rather than obvious solution. This is the type of IP worth protecting.

Expert Witness Credentials

The 30(b)(6) testimony in the TT litigation established credentials as an expert witness in financial trading technology:

Demonstrated capabilities:

• Explain complex technical systems to legal audiences

• Provide corporate knowledge representation

• Withstand cross-examination on technical details

• Present development timelines and design decisions clearly

• Understand patent law implications of software development

Subsequent expert witness work: Multiple engagements representing Cantor Fitzgerald in IP litigation, building on experience from the TT case

Current application: These credentials enable Handleport's expert witness services for commodities trading and FinTech disputes, backed by actual litigation experience in major cases.

Historical Perspective

Two decades later:

The electronic trading patent wars are largely resolved, but similar dynamics play out in new technology areas:

• Mobile apps: Patent battles over obvious UI gestures and interaction patterns

• E-commerce: Patents on common shopping cart and checkout processes

• Blockchain/crypto: Beginning to see patent filings on DeFi mechanisms and protocol designs

The fundamental tension remains: Balancing IP protection incentivizing innovation against patent thickets that stifle progress.

Personal position: Patents should document genuine innovation solving hard problems, not lock up obvious solutions to universal challenges. The perpetual futures patent represents real foresight; the ladder display was an obvious solution that shouldn't have been patentable by anyone.

Personal Reflection

EccoWare was formative. It's where I learned that:

• Great technology requires understanding the problem domain deeply

• Performance optimization is both art and science

• Patents should document real innovation, not speculative ideas

• Building for institutional clients demands different rigor than retail products

• The best solutions often come from small, focused teams

Twenty-five years later, these lessons remain relevant. The technology has changed (blockchain instead of C++), but the principles haven't.